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A peaceful society depends on the high ethical standards of its lawyers: 
Communal trust in the legal process gives force to the law that helps 
to maintain society as a cohesive organism. In the past decade of 
turmoil, mutual trust and confidence in our institutions has declined; 
individual interests have been increasingly collectivized and subjected 
to legal processes.1 Under such circumstances, the ethics of lawyers 
have become still more noticeable and important.
It is impossible to determine whether there has been a decline or 
an improvement in ethical standards of lawyers in this era compared 
with other times. The new importance and prominence of lawyers 
in society is a state of affairs which seems likely to continue for some 
time, however, and attorneys2 and courts3 have addressed themselves 
in recent years to the ethical standards required by the lawyer’s new 
role. This Commentary asserts that although much attention has been 
paid to immoral conduct and the means to prevent it, the greater hazard 
to lawyers generally is that of amoral conduct. The appropriate safe­
guard against amorality is greater concern for the lawyer’s duty to self.
I . A m o r a l it y  a n d  R e l a t iv is m
The conventional distinction between amorality and immorality is 
particularly cogent for the lawyer. Amoral conduct implies that the 
actor has no standard of right and wrong by which to judge conduct
* Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law; Visiting Professor of 
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1. See generally G. L od g e , T h e  N e w  A m e r ica n  I d e o lo g y  (1975).
2. See, e.g., M . F reedm an , L a w y e rs ’ E th ic s  in  a n  A d v e rs a ry  S ystem  (1975); 
Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 Y a le  L.J. 1069 (1970).
3. See, e.g., United Mineworkers v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) 
(lawyer paid salary by union may represent members without charge); Brotherhood of 
R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (union may 
channel members’ job injury claims to selected lawyers); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415 (1963) (NAACP may encourage public to bring suits through NAACP staff attor­
neys).
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and, in fact, fails to perceive that the conduct in question even raises 
an ethical issue. Like a cog in a machine, the amoral person is oblivi­
ous to all about him save his own narrowly defined function. Ex­
pediency in fulfilling one’s role is perceived as the final and the only 
good. Immoral conduct, on the other hand, implies that the actor is 
aware of moral standards but has consciously chosen to violate them.
While immorality—conscious wrongdoing—is a frequent subject of 
criticism of lawyers,4 amorality may create more widespread uneasiness 
among the public. No research on this point has been published, but 
it seems reasonable to suppose that the lawyer’s role as a hired advocate 
is itself the source of much concern. Those vanquished in legal disputes 
rarely attribute high moral purpose to their opponents. More often 
than not, and sometimes with justification, the citizen unhappily or un­
successfully entangled in legal machinery blames the lawyer, the judge, 
or the legal process itself for his misfortune. It is easy and natural 
to view opposing advocates as unprincipled hired gunslingers.
The general tendency in the United States to legalize disputes0 exacer­
bates this problem. The courts are often the forum chosen to resolve 
disputes between deeply held values and to answer political questions. 
Whether courts are the proper agency to resolve such conflicts is beyond 
the scope of this discussion. Whenever members of the public are 
dissatisfied with the outcome of the adversary process, however, they 
are likely to question the competence and the morality of the advocates 
of opposing views.
In a society undergoing major social, political, and moral changes, 
law intrudes farther and farther into the lives of individuals and insti­
tutions; the potential for discontent with lawyers, the agents of uncom­
fortable change, inevitably grows. In these circumstances, the lawyer 
is or should be drawn to systematic examination of his purpose and 
principles.6
4. See, e.g., J.C. G o u ld e n , T h e  B e n ch w a rm e rs  (1974); R. N a d er , V e r d ic t s  o n  
L a w y e r s  (1976).
5  A . d e  T o c q u e v i l l e ,  D e m o c r a c y  in  A m e r ica , 89-93 (J. Mayer & M. Lemer eds. 
1 9 6 6 ).
6. The gap between philosophers and the practical person involved in the daily task 
of making society work is a continued source of mutual mistrust, too often a convenient 
excuse for one group not to consider the thoughts and insights of the other. Such a 
state of affairs is tragic, since neither group can realize its full potential without the 
other. The philosopher suffers if excessive detachment from practical things divorces 
philosophical speculation from reported reality and renders speculation irrelevant; the
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The lawyer’s usual response to accusations of amorality rests on 
the nature of the adversary process in which he is engaged. Neither 
advocate in a dispute can assume the truth of his position; “truth” 
emerges from a clash of opposing views.7 So stated, however, this 
response posits a problem without resolving it. If the contest determines 
truth, then the advocate for the loser puts forth untruths. Witnesses 
give conflicting statements about the same facts; if at least one descrip­
tion of the facts is false, it would appear that a substantial number of 
lawyers are liars. Citation to “authority” is matched by citation to 
countervailing “authority” to such a degree that the structure of law 
appears to be a Tower of Babel in danger of collapsing under the stress 
of lawyers clamoring over, around, and under the edifice.8 This led 
Felix Cohen to observe: “How the edifice of justice can be supported 
by the efforts of liars at the bar and ex-liars on the bench is one of 
the paradoxes of legal logic which the man in the street has never 
solved.” 9
The simplistic view of the adversary process therefore merely states, 
without resolving, the suspicion that the legal system chains lawyers to 
immorality, to the conscious espousal of error. Philosophy of law, of
practical person’s rejection of philosophical speculation may cause a narrow perception 
of reality and values, crippling his ability to function effectively in a world of change. 
See Frankel, Philosophy of Practice, in E th ic s  and S o c ia l  J u s t ic e  1 (E . Kiejer & M . 
Munite eds. 1968). Lawyers, as the persons charged with carrying out many of society’s 
functions, are in particular need of a capacity for philosophical thought. At the same 
time, lawyers are continually confronted with reality and the pressures of representing 
clients, paying the overhead, and living their own lives. With regard to the subject of 
this Commentary, the lawyer’s potentially conflicting roles are the source of continuous 
ethical difficulties; see notes 20-31 infra and accompanying text. Such issues cannot be 
understood or satisfactorily resolved without awareness of philosophy in its etymological 
sense— the love of wisdom.
1, Report of the Joint Conference of the American Bar Association and the Asso­
ciation of American Law Schools on Professional Responsibility, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1160 
(1958) (“An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combatting 
[the] natural human tendency to judge too swiftly. .
8, Excessive complexity can, of course, destroy the fairness, comprehensibility, and 
utility of an area of legal principles designed to achieve societal goals. Aside from popu­
lar conceptions about the complexity of a field of “law,” even lawyers sometimes recog­
nize that something is remiss in an area of legal principles when its proclaimed goals 
are frustrated, injustices multiply geometrically, and experts in the field cannot hope to 
comprehend all areas of the subject. The Internal Revenue Code comes to mind as one 
of our more byzantine legal structures in need of substantial reform. The primary politi­
cal obstacle to reform will probably be the fear of massive unemployment among ac­
countants and lawyers if true reform did take place.
9. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 Y a l e  LJ. 238,238 (1950).
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course, is not a topic that often engages practicing attorneys, nor does 
it figure largely in law school curricula.10 Those who reflect most 
seriously about the adversary system, however, reject the simplistic view 
that law is a lying contest; they realize that the adversary system is an 
ill-defined process in which a forcefield of shifting principles interacts 
with multidimensional “facts.” 11
In a certain sense, it is true that lawyers are liars. In the same 
sense, poets, historians and map-makers are also liars. For it is 
the function of lawyers, poets, historians and map-makers not to 
reproduce reality but to illumine some aspect of reality, and it 
always makes for deceit to pretend that what is thus illumined is 
the whole of reality. None of us can ever possibly tell the whole 
truth, though we may conscientiously will to do so and ask divine 
help towards that end. The ancient wisdom of our common law 
recognizes that men are bound to differ in their views of fact and 
law, not because some are honest and others dishonest, but because 
each of us operates in a value charged field which gives shape and 
color to whatever we see.12
Thus, one philosophical assumption lawyers ought to share is that 
truth is a matter of degree, and that dogmatic assumptions about reality, 
facts, legal principles, values, and ethics are working presumptions at 
best and dangerous traps at worst. The principle of tolerance for the 
views of another is an occupational prerequisite for the lawyer.
A  philosopher would characterize this view of the legal process as 
“relativism”; it would be emphatically rejected by anyone believing 
that either reason or revelation produces absolutes. The lawyer is more 
likely to call his attitude “common sense.” The adversary process 
rests on the assumption that the search for truth is a continuous process, 
and that even in the precise sciences, one paradigm regularly gives way 
to another contradictory paradigm,13 with no end to the process expected.
10. An important departure from the more traditional law school jurisprudence 
teaching materials is W. B ish in  & C. S to n e , L aw , L angu age, a n d  E th ic s  (1972). The 
hook examines the philosophical assumptions that underlie different jurisprudential 
“schools,” and does not merely collect the writings of the leaders of each labeled school 
to be studiously read and memorized by students. The former approach develops a deep 
understanding of the philosophical issues involved and a healthy skepticism necessary 
for competent lawyering. See Oberer, Luncheon Speech to New Bar Members, 3 U ta h  
B.J. 25 (1975). '
11. See generally F. C o h e n , E t h ic a l  S y stem s an d  L e g a l  Id e a ls  (1933).
12. Cohen, supra note 9, at 238.
13. See generally T. K u h n , T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  S c ie n t i f i c  R e v o lu t io n s  (2d ed. 
1970).
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Even the fundamental legal principles on which social order seems 
to rest are subject to continual change. For example, the value and 
concept of “personhood” has been central in western legal thought,14 
and underlies the expression of several legal concepts across the range 
of disputes and relationships found in our legal system. “Person” is 
a relatively stable concept, yet it is not immutable; it once included the 
concepts of ship and corporation and excluded slaves and women. 
Tampering with the concept of personhood can send tremors throughout 
society, as when courts exclude fetal life from the protection of the 
right of personhood,15 establish when personhood ends for the hope­
lessly incapacitated,16 equalize voting rights by tying voting power to 
personhood rather than to acreage,17 or elaborate and extend the rights 
of personhood in the civil rights and criminal law decisions of the 
past few decades.18
At the periphery of our culture are concepts not central to what a 
society is or aspires to be and therefore more vulnerable to the assault 
of fact and experience. For example, the holder-in-due-course concept 
of commercial law, a cardinal rubric for generations of lawyers and 
a mercantile society, is rapidly eroding, since the underlying purpose 
for its existence is no longer relevant.19 In the dark space of dis­
carded legal principles, the holder-in-due-course doctrine may soon 
find the companionship of privity, “states’ rights,” proximate cause, 
pierced corporate veils, and the Latin maxims of better or at least older 
days.
The individual who chooses law as a profession is soon confronted 
in law school with the subtleties of the law in evolution. By a process
14. See generally T h e  S ta tu s  o f  t h e  In d iv id u a l in  E a s t  an d  W e s t  (C . Moore ed. 
1968).
15. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (guardian of comatose patient 
may withdraw life-support systems if physician and Ethics Committee find no reasonable 
possibility of recovery).
17. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580 (1964) (“people, not land or trees or pas­
tures, vote"); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (voters in. different counties must 
be given equal weight); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (apportionment of state 
legislature presents justiciable question of equal protection).
18. See, e.g., B u rea u  o f  N a t io n a l  A f fa i r s ,  T h e  C r im in a l R e v o lu t io n  & I t s  
A f t e r m a t h : 1960-1974 (1975); A . G o ld b e r g , E q u a l J u s t ic e  (1971).
19. See, e.g., Robbert, Consumer Protection in Practice: Securing Debtors’ Rights, 
23 La. B.J. 151 (1975); Note, Focus on Debtor? Rights: Making The Bill Collector 
Pay, 23 U. K an. L . R ev . 681-707 (1975).
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like osmosis, one absorbs the traditions and methodology of the pro­
fession. One learns to “think like a lawyer,” analyze the “facts” in 
light of “the law,” and remain poised in a dispute without knowing 
or caring what its outcome will be; “issues” and not conclusions are 
examined. The relativism necessary to the practice of law shifts easily 
into cynicism; tolerance for other views becomes quite naturally the 
belief that all views are equally wrong, and that “truth” and “justice,” 
the supposed aims of the legal process, are empty words. The adver­
sary process of law is naturally seen, not as the central nervous sys­
tem of society, but a cynical exercise of lawyerly skills by practitioners 
indifferent to the outcome. The legal profession, while no more or 
less vulnerable to immorality than others, seems to be in considerable 
danger of a profound amorality.
n .  T h e  C ode  o f  P r o fe ssio n a l  R e spo n sib ility
Into an uncertain world of ever-changing fact and principle steps 
the skeptical lawyer, trustee for society’s values, well schooled in his 
craft and assigned diverse roles by the organized bar’s self-defined Code 
of Professional Responsibility.20 The Code assumes that universal 
ethical responsibilities for lawyers are to be defined in terms of the law­
yer’s duties to the profession, his client, the courts, and society at large. 
The Code has been criticized because it was drafted with the perspective 
and to meet the needs of lawyers practicing in large firms, while ignoring 
the circumstances of solo or small firm practitioners;21 because it is more 
concerned with protecting the economic interests of attorneys than ex­
panding the availability of legal services;22 because universally defined 
ethical duties cannot meet the needs of lawyers operating in a bewildering 
array of different circumstances;23 because the Code’s definition of 
m i n i m u m  roles and duties are interpreted by lawyers as a definition of 
maximum roles and duties.24
Some of these criticisms are valid, but miss the fundamental difficulty 
of the Code. The Code begins on the correct path by defining the roles
20. ABA C o d e  o f  P r o fe s s io n a l  R e s p o n s ib ility ; ABA C o d e  o f  J u d ic ia l C o n ­
d u c t .  .
21. Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group 
Moral Code, 37 G e o . W ash . L. R e v . 244 (1968).
22. Note, Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 79 Y a l e  L.J. 1179 (1970).
23. See, e.g., J. C a r l in , L a w y e rs  o n  T h e ir  O w n  3 (1962); Shuchman, supra note
21.
24. See, e.g., J. P ike, B e y o n d  t h e  Law 11 (1963).
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lawyers must play in a legal system. In an adversary system, the Code 
sees the duty of lawyers to defend their clients “zealously within the 
bounds of the law” ;25 lawyers are guardians of the “integrity” of the 
profession,26 and “active assistants in improving the legal system.” 27 
Specific ethical responsibilities are extensively defined through three 
levels of varying generalities and sanctions: the canons, the ethical con­
siderations, and the disciplinary rules. The canons are “statements of 
axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of profes­
sional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, 
with the legal system, and with the legal profesion.” The ethical consid­
erations are “aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward 
which every member of the profession should strive.” The disciplinary 
rules state the “minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can 
fall without being subject to disciplinary action.” 28
Even though the Code of Professional Responsibility is the product 
of a private special interest group representing fewer than all lawyers, it 
is in general the product of good intentions, and has had a salutary effect 
in establishing definitions for performance of the roles fulfilled by many 
members of the profession. Many state bars have adopted it as the basis 
from which disciplinary action will be determined. It is the focus of 
most law school classes on legal ethics. Without question, the Code is 
the underlying paradigm by which many lawyers establish and measure 
their ethical values and behavior. Were it scrupulously enforced,29 the 
Code would be a powerful force in raising the public standards of pro­
fessional responsibility to the client, the profession, and the administra­
tion of justice. The major defect of the Code, however, is that it simply 
does not go far enough.
The Code does not mention the problem of amorality, although it does 
indirectly serve to define the difficulty further. The Code prescribes 
duties the lawyer owes to others—to society, to his profession, to his 
client—but says nothing of the lawyer’s duty to self. The internal guide-
25. ABA C o d e  o f  P r o fe s s io n a l  R e s p o n s ib ility  Canon 7.
26. ABA C o d e  o f  P r o fe s s io n a l  R e s p o n s ib ility  Canon 1. Canons 2 and 3 and 
the disciplinary rules may also be viewed as rules seeking to maintain the “integrity” 
of the profession—the economic “integrity” of the profession.
27. ABA C o d e  o f  P r o fe s s io n a l  R e s p o n s ib ili ty  Canon 8.
28. ABA C o d e  o f  P r o fe s s io n a l  R e s p o n s ib ility  Preamble and Preliminary State­
ment.
29. See Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges To Report Other Lawyers? 
Breaches of The Standards of The Legal Profession, 1976 U t a h  L . R e v . 95.
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lines that must limit one’s obedience to orders or external duties are 
unmentioned and unexamined. The Code only seeks to “point the way 
to the aspiring” and to provide “standards by which to judge the trans­
gressor.” 30 The only reference to the deeper foundations for ethical 
behavior is the caution that “each lawyer must find within his own con­
science the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his ac­
tions should rise above minimum standards.” 31
It is perhaps unfair to criticize the Code for something it purports 
not to do and, in fact, cannot hope to do— establish a fundamental self­
conception and series of virtues that guide perceptions of reality, reflec­
tions upon moral questions, definition of roles, and patterns of human be­
havior. But in failing to make the ethical limitations of the Code more 
explicit, the Code may, in fact, be counterproductive to developing and 
reinforcing an ethical profession of the highest order. By ignoring the 
lawyer’s relation to himself and instead emphasizing only the lawyer’s 
relation to others and the profession, the Code allows lawyers to ration­
alize many forms of conduct which would otherwise transgress their 
duties to self and, consequently, widely held moral values. The empha­
sis on duty to others leads naturally and dangerously to the “hired-gun” 
model for deciding ethical questions. The rules that define immorality 
may reinforce the dangers of amorality, and allow an attorney to justify 
almost any conduct that promotes the interests of the client.
Ethical issues are far more complex than the Code’s minimal role 
definitions and have more dimensions than the Code’s categories ac­
knowledge. But by omission, at least, the Code shows that the legal 
profession’s besetting hazard, amorality, must be dealt with by strength­
ening the lawyer’s duty to self.
ttt T h e  C o n c e p t  o f  Se l f  a n d  E t h ic a l  D e v e l o p m e n t
The concept of self in law influences major characteristics of the legal 
system as well as the culture whose values it expresses. For example, 
primitive Roman law assumed the family as the unit of self in society and 
predicated most rights and liabilities in terms of family and status,82 a 
view of self quite unlike the atomistic individual human being in a system 
based on the Lockean assumption of self. For several American Indian
30. See note 28 supra.
31. Id.
32. H. M a in e , A n c ie n t  L a w  109-65 (3d ed. 1888).
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cultures, the concept of self has no meaning independent from concep­
tions of the tribe or clan; as a result, many of the “inalienable” rights 
“inherent” in modem American society based on the role of the “indi­
vidual” have little meaning for descendants of these Indian cultures.33 
Western legal tradition has assumed the existence of a separate and in­
dependent self capable of reflection and controlling individual behavior. 
The concept is deeply ingrained within our philosophy, political institu­
tions, and legal system; it directly influences the process by which we 
perceive events. We conceive of rights and privileges as attached to 
individuals, rather than groups; the rights and liberties protected by our 
Constitution are those of persons and citizens, not of groups or classes. 
Ownership of property is an individual, rather than class, privilege; 
self-fulfillment is universally held to be a virtue. These beliefs are too 
widely held to require documentation or further discussion.
We need not here investigate what reality, if any, lies behind the 
concept of “self.” A substantial body of thought holds that no objective 
reality corresponds to the term— that human beings are simply patterns 
of conditioned behavior.34 Resolution of the questions concerning the 
existence and perception of the self is one of the central concerns of 
philosophy.35 For the present discussion, however, we need not enter 
this complex area. Whatever the reality of the self or its underlying 
nature, a reliance on a concept of self and the way it is defined is clearly 
crucial to the values of our culture and the ways in which the legal system 
expresses those values. We act as if there were meaning to the concept 
of a self distinct from other selves in society, a self capable of conscious 
thought and memory, responsible for its own actions. Whether these 
assumptions can be confirmed or not, they underlie all ethical judgments 
in our society. Our relationship to this “self,” real or assumed, is there­
fore the basis of individual ethical standards.
33. For an analysis of early anthropological studies that formed the basis of our un­
derstanding of these Indian cultures and the conception which these cultures held con­
cerning “self,” see Hallowell, The Beginnings of Anthropology in America, in S e le c t e d  
P ap ers F ro m  T h e  A m e r ica n  A n t h r o p o lo g is t  1888-1920, at 1, 34-58 (F . De Laguna 
ed. 1960).
34. See generally B.F. S k in n er , B eyon d  F re e d o m  a n d  D ig n ity  (1971).
35. See, e.g., H . C a s t e l l ,  T h e  S e l f  in  P h ilo s o p h y  (1965); D. H u m e, T r e a t is e  
o n  H um an N a tu r e , pt. IV , § 6 (1739); J. L o ck e , A n  E ssay  C o n c e r n in g  H u m an  U n ­
d ersta n d in g  ch. 27 (2d ed. 1964); R. U n g e r , K n o w le d g e  & P o l i t ic s ,  191-235 
(1975); Werkmeister, The Status of the Person in Western Ethics, in T h e  S ta tu s  o f  
t h e  In d iv id u a l in  E a st an d  W e s t  317 (C . Moore ed. 1968).
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From the standpoint of the Western assumption that the self is all- 
important, it is therefore natural to classify cultures in terms of the role 
played by the concept of self. Lawrence Kohlberg, a developmental 
psychologist, has proposed a universal process of moral development 
based upon his empirical studies of several cultures. Kohlberg claims 
to have found a common sequential pattern of six stages of moral de­
velopment present in a variety of cultures.86 His description of these 
stages of moral development is lexical, and defines ways of thinking 
about universal moral questions. Kohlberg’s definition of moral stages 
and the accompanying motives for engaging in moral behavior in each 
stage provide a useful and penetrating way to consider ethical develop­
ment in the legal profession and in legal education. Kohlberg’s stages 
of moral development may be paraphrased as follows:
Definition of Moral Stages 
Stage I
The Punishment and Obedience 
Level: The physical consequences 
of action determine its goodness or 
badness regardless of the human 
meaning or value of these conse­
quences.
Stage II
The Instrumental Relativist Orien­
tation: Right action consists of 
that which instrumentally satisfies 
one’s needs and occasionally the 
needs of others.
Stage III
The Interpersonal Concordance or 
“Good Boy-Nice Girl” Orienta­
tion: Good behavior is that which 
pleases or helps others and is ap­
proved by them; much conformity 
to stereotypical images of what is 
majority behavior.
Stage IV
The “Law and Order” Orientation: 
Right behavior consists of doing 
one’s duty, showing respect for 
authority, and maintaining the giv­
en social order for its own sake.
Motives for Engaging In 
Moral Behavior
Action is motivated by avoidance of 
punishment, and “conscience” is ir­
rational fear of punishment.
Action motivated 
ward or benefit.
by desire for re-
Action motivated by anticipation of 
disapproval of others, actual or imag­
ined; differentiation of disapproval 
from punishment, fear or pain.
Action motivated by anticipation of 
dishonor, that is institutionalized 
blame for failure of duty and by 
guilt over concrete harm done others.
36. Kohlberg, From Is to Ought, in C o g n it iv e  D e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  E p is te m o lo g y , 
164-65, 170-71, 151-235 (T. Mischel ed. 1971).
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Stage V
The Social-Contract Legalistic Or­
ientation with Utilitarian Over­
tones: Right action tends to be de­
fined in terms of general individ­
ual rights and standards which 
have been critically examined and 
agreed upon by the whole of soci­
ety. There is a clear awareness of 
the relativism of personal values 
and opinions and a corresponding 
emphasis upon procedural rules for 
reaching consensus.
Stage VI
The Universal-Ethical Principal 
Orientation: Right is defined by 
the decision of conscience in ac­
cord with self-chosen ethical prin­
ciples appealing to a logical com­
prehensiveness, universality and 
consistency.
Kohlberg’s study not only claims a universal progression of stages 
of moral development, but also a universal reliance upon a common 
fund of moral categories, concepts, or principles.37 Kohlberg believes 
that differences among individuals and cultures are really differences 
in stage or developmental status. Individual development may cease 
at one level without progressing to the next stage. Furthermore, dif­
ferences in cultural circumstances may influence the speed of develop­
ment but not the existence and sequence of the pattern of development. 
Kohlberg concludes that
there are differences in fundamental moral principles between in­
dividuals or between groups; differences in stage. However, these 
stages or fundamental ethical principles on which people differ (a) 
are culturally universal, (b) occur in an invariant order of devel­
opment, and (c) are interpretations of categories which are uni­
versal.38
One need not accept Kohlberg’s claims to view his theory as a useful 
categorization of ethical systems from the point of view of the assumed 
primary importance of individual self-determination. Whether we view 
his system as a convenient expression of our beliefs about ethics, or as
37. Id. at 176.
38. Id. at 177.
Concern about maintaining respect of 
equals and of the community’s rea­
soned respect; concern about own 
self-respect, that is to avoid judging 
self as irrational, inconsistent and 
nonpurposive.
Concern about self-condemnation for 
violating one’s own principles; differ­
entiates between community respect 
and self-respect; and, differentiates 
between self-respect for achieving 
rationality and self-respect for main­
taining moral principles.
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a discovery about universal ethical development, it is an equally useful 
standard against which to measure the ethical effect of legal education 
and practice. From either point of view, Kohlberg’s scheme suggests 
disturbing conclusions.
IV. L e g a l  E d u c a t io n  a n d  E t h i c a l  D e v e lo p m e n t
Legal education as presently structured and practiced risks stunt­
ing moral development in stages one or two of Kohlberg’s model; levels 
of development that Kohlberg defines as a “preconventional level” in 
which:
[T]he child is responsive to cultural labels of good and bad, right 
or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physi­
cal or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, 
exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those 
who enunciate the rules and labels.80
Kohlberg’s definition of “preconventional level” must be considered in 
light of legal education’s reliance upon the “Socratic method” in large 
impersonal classes.
Misuse of the Socratic method may terrorize students, and create 
a cynicism founded upon a forced divorce between the intellectual and 
emotional side of a student.40 Legal teaching often relies upon punish­
ment or reward rather than an attitude of self-fulfillment as the stimulus 
to learn,41 and therefore creates a substantial risk of causing a regres­
sion in moral development. Legal education, as well as other forms 
of education, cannot afford to surrender its insistence upon rigorous 
intellectual development of essential skills and a level of self-discipline 
necessary to perform effectively the diverse roles assigned lawyers 
in society. Nonetheless, greater care must be taken to assure that the 
educational atmosphere recognizes that the goal of classroom dialogue 
and other educational techniques is individual self-development. 
Socrates’ guiding admonition that the objective of pursuing knowledge 
is “to know thyself’ is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in a class­
room atmosphere dominated by anxiety over performance. Although 
the economics of legal education precludes small classes and individual 
instruction, the ethical casualties caused by abuse of the Socratic
39. Id. at 164.
40. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal 
Education, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 93, 116-41 (1968).
41. Id.
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method could surely be minimized if legal educators understood the 
objectives and limitations of the Socratic method and made sophisti­
cated use of its techniques in light of the emotional as well as the 
intellectual development of students.42
Students come to law school in varying stages of moral develop­
ment, but with a generally similar set of moral values, goals, and ideals 
which stress honesty, respect for others, individual self-worth, and simi­
lar characteristics one might expect in any group of highly motivated 
and idealistic young people. The rigorous analytical experience of 
law school has varying effects upon students; some students continue 
to hold and live by their values, goals, and ideals; others become cynical 
and seem to be able to rationalize anything they do; still others con­
struct impenetrable shells that hide their character and motivation. All 
too many become ethical “dropouts” in the pursuit of grades, institu­
tional decorations to aid employment prospects, or a means to cope 
with the competitive pressures of academic and psychological survival.
The impact of the law school experience upon character and ethical 
development has not been widely studied or even seriously considered 
by many law professors. It must become so if law schools and legal 
educators are to take account of the degree to which they fail to instill 
a high degree of ethical responsibility in their students. Law schools 
may actually be creating amoral lawyers, whose skills of rationalization, 
attempted division of intellectual and emotional sides of their personali­
ties, and insensitivity to ethical issues will become increasingly dan­
gerous in the highly complex, specialized, and competitive world of 
law practice. Legal ethics, in the sense of personal values for determin­
ing questions of right and wrong, should become an implicit part of 
every course in the law school curriculum.43 Individual ethics are not 
derived from the study and punctilious following of a written rubric. 
Only by continuous self-reflection in terms of one’s own personal values, 
sensitivity to ethical issues raised by various areas of legal specialty, 
and repeated exposure to the values of respected models of ethical per­
sons (including, one hopes, a student’s teachers) can one expect to 
develop further the individual ethical potential and standards of stu­
dents in law school.
42. See Taylor, Law School Stress and The “Deformation Professionelle27 J. 
L e g a l E du c. 251 (1975).
43. See Weinstein, On the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 72 COLtJM. L. R e v . 452 
(1972).
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Ethics classes, mandatory or otherwise, that treat the Code of Pro­
fessional Responsibility as the definition of a lawyer’s ethical duties 
risk retarding a student’s ethical development To paraphrase Kohl­
berg, in such narrowly focused classes in ethics, students are taught 
that maintaining the expectations of the group is
perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and 
obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity 
to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of 
actively maintaining, supporting and justifying the order, and of 
identifying with the persons or groups involved in it.44
While this conventional structure for thinking about ethical duties helps 
individuals define their roles and motivates conformity to the roles 
defined, it lacks the dimension of an internal wellspring for ethical 
behavior as defined by stages five and six in Kohlberg’s pattern. These 
categories are labeled by Kohlberg as the “post-conventional, autono­
mous or principled level.” They are distinguished from lower levels of 
moral development because they “define moral principles which have 
validity and application apart from the authority of the groups of per­
sons holding these principles, and apart from the individuals’ own iden­
tification with these groups.” 45
To the extent that ethics classes in law schools consider the Code of 
Professional Responsibility as the sole source of one’s ethical duties 
and encourage students to be concerned only with what others think 
of them, the moral development of the individual is incomplete and 
misleading. Ethics classes must also develop an additional and stronger 
incentive for ethical behavior—what the individual will think of him­
self in light of his own internalized principles and values.
V . Se l f  in  E v e r y d a y  L e g a l  P r a c tic e
As we have seen, the professional hazard of legal practice is the 
“hired gun” justification for ethical choices and behavior, which in 
its extreme form could appropriately be called the “Nuremburg De­
fense” model of legal ethics. This model justifies any action on behalf 
of a client—a position of extreme ethical relativism which some profess 
but few live by, and which is clearly not sanctioned even by the Code 
of Professional Responsibility. •
44. Kohlberg, supra note 36, at 164-65.
45. Id.
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A client does not buy the services of a lawyer as one might buy the 
services of a slave or a prostitute.46 The relationship is horizonal rather 
than vertical. The best interests of a client require an independent and 
objective evaluation of the client’s problem, and counseling about the 
appropriate course of conduct by one who is a “counselor” in every 
sense of the word. If, of course, a lawyer’s self-values and conscience 
conflict with a client’s interests or objectives, the client should be in­
vited to find other representation.47
While few lawyers may perceive themselves simply as hired guns, 
many may believe they live out their lives in Kohlberg’s fifth stage 
where
right action tends to be defined in terms of individual rights, and 
standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by 
the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism 
of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis 
upon procedural rules for reaching consensus.48
At this level of moral development, the motivation for adherence 
to ethical standards is a “concern about maintaining the [rationally de­
fined] respect of equals and of the community” as well as the motiva­
tions associated with earlier stages of moral development. In Kohl­
berg’s fifth stage the procedure for deciding ethical questions has be­
come partially internalized but is not yet complete, since ethical 
values have not become sufficiently identified with self to be trig­
gered by the more powerful forces of self-worth, self-praise, and 
self-condemnation. To the extent that this portrait represents the cur­
rent state of the majority of the members of the profession, it leaves 
room for reaching a higher state of moral development. Kohlberg’s 
model suggests that if the profession wishes to raise its collective ethical 
standards, the time has come to insist that lawyers live first by “their 
decisions of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles 
appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consist­
ency.” 49
46. See J. P ike, supra note 24, at 2.
47. See T hode, The Ethical Standard For the Advocate, 39 T e x . L. R ev . 575 
(1961).
48. Kohlberg, supra note 36, at 164-65.
49. Id. at 165. The substantive content of individual “decisions of conscience” is 
derived from many sources and cannot be defined without reference to society, nature, 
and one’s roles in life. See R. U n g e r , supra note 35.
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VI. C o n c lu s io n
Decisionmaking about ethical questions is and should be a bloody 
business, deeply dependent upon self-conception and the ability to 
engage in self-reflection. Lawyers face a particularly difficult con­
flict of irreconcilable role definitions since they owe duties to their 
clients, the courts, the profession, and society at large as well as to 
themselves. The point of this essay is not to suggest that these role 
definitions can or should be ignored but that they should be weighed 
in light of one’s concept of self and those values (reflectively chosen 
with regard to universality and consistency) one perceives as essen­
tial to the maintenance of personal integrity. A profession which ignores 
or segregates self from the process for resolving ethical issues cannot 
reach the highest stage of moral development. Nor can such a profes­
sion merit the trust of the citizen at large that is necessary if law is to 
provide the condition of a peaceful and just society.
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